An IMEI Number Is NOT Unique to Each Mobile Phone

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Have you ever used the phrase “sort of unique”? Something is either unique or it isn’t. And International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) numbers fail the uniquness test.

Claims that International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) numbers are unique

Here’s what a few companies say about the IMEI number on each mobile phone. Emphasis mine.

  • Thales: “The IMEI (International Mobile Equipment Identity) number is a unique 15-digit serial number for identifying a device; every mobile phone in the world has one.”
  • Verizon: “An IMEI stands for International Mobile Equipment Identity. Think of it as your phone’s fingerprint — it’s a 15-digit number unique to each device.”
  • Blue Goat Cyber: “In today’s interconnected world, where our smartphones have become an indispensable part of our lives, it is essential to understand the concept of IMEI – the International Mobile Equipment Identity. This unique identifier plays a crucial role in various aspects of our mobile devices, from security to tracking and repairs.”

These and other descriptions of the IMEI prominently use the word “unique.” Not “sort of unique,” but “unique.”

Which means (for non-person entities, just like persons) that if someone can find a SINGLE reliable instance of more than one mobile phone having the same IMEI number, then the claim of uniqueness falls apart completely.

Examples of non-uniqueness of IMEI numbers on mobile phones

People who claim IMEI uniqueness obviously didn’t read my Bredemarket blog post of April 1, in which I WASN’T fooling.

  • I talked about an incident in India in which a cyber fraud operation “specialised in IMEI cloning.”
  • And an incident in Canada in which someone was scammed out of C$1,000, even though the phone had a valid IMEI.

IMEICheck.net even tells you (at a high level) how to clone an IMEI. It’s not easy, but it’s not impossible.

“In theory, hackers can clone a phone using its IMEI, but this requires significant effort. They need physical access to the device or SIM card to extract data, typically using specialized tools.

“The cloning process involves copying the IMEI and other credentials necessary to create a functional duplicate of the phone. However, IMEI number security features in modern devices are designed to prevent unauthorized cloning.”

So don’t claim an IMEI is unique when there is evidence to the contrary. As I said in my April post:

NOTHING provides 100.00000% security. Not even an IMEI number.”

What does this mean for your identity product?

If you offer an identity product, educate your prospects and avoid unsupportable claims. While a few prospects may be swayed by “100%” claims, the smarter ones will appreciate more supportable statements, such as “Our facial recognition algorithm demonstrated a 0.0022 false non-match rate in the mugshot:mugshot NIST FRTE 1:1 laboratory testing.”

When you are truthful in educating your prospects, they will (apologizes in advance for using this overused word) trust you and become more inclined to buy from you.

If you need help in creating content (blog posts, case studies, white papers, proposals, and many more), work with Bredemarket to create the customer-focused content you need. Book a free meeting with me.

When Prospects Ask Technical Marketers the Tough Questions

Some technical marketers are expert at spinning soft fluffy stories about how their AI-powered toilet paper can cure cancer…which can be very persuasive as long as the prospects don’t ask any questions.

  • For example, let’s say you’re telling a Chick-fil-A in Kettering, Ohio that you’ll keep 17 year olds out of their restaurant. Are you ready when the prospect asks, “How do you KNOW that the person without ID is 17 years and 359 days old, and is not 18?”
  • Or let’s say you’re telling a state voter agency that you’ll enforce voter ID laws. Are you ready when the prospect asks, “How do you KNOW that the voter ID is real and not fake? Or that it is fake and not real?”

Be prepared to answer the tough questions. Expert testimonials. Independent assessments of your product’s accuracy. Customer case studies.

Analyze your product’s weaknesses. (And the threats, if you’re a SWOT groupie.)

And call in the expert help.

How to Increase Awareness of Your Company’s Offerings With Blog Posts (A Repurpose)

How can blog posts increase the awareness of your identity/biometric or technology company’s products and services? I’m going to explain how in this blog post. 

By the way, this is a rewrite of my more technical Tuesday blog post “How Can Your Technology Company Increase Product Benefit Awareness Right Now?” Because you can rewrite blog posts when you feel like it.

Why a funnel?

Imagine there’s a funnel. It’s easy if you try. But this funnel doesn’t stream water, but people. (Or wombats.)

The funnel. Imagen 4.

In this funnel, the people (or wombats) who are potentially interested in your offering—your prospects—start at the very top. The few who actually buy your offering emerge from the bottom. 

But how do you get people to enter the funnel and become aware of your offering?

How can blog posts help you?

One great way to let people know about your offering is by blog posts such as this one. 

Blogs are a fast way to tell your prospects how your offering can help them. And you can create blog posts very quickly, within days or even hours. 

If you want to make prospects aware of your company’s service, write a blog post.

What can Bredemarket offer to you?

One of Bredemarket’s offerings is…writing blog posts for other companies. I can help your identity/biometric or technology company write blog posts so you can get more people to learn about your services.

If you want to learn how I can help your company write blog posts, visit bredemarket.com/mark.

Identity Assurance Level 3 (IAL3): When Identity Assurance Level 2 (IAL2) Isn’t Good Enough

(Picture designed by Freepik.)

(Part of the biometric product marketing expert series)

I’ve talked about Identity Assurance Levels 1, 2, and 3 on several occasions. Most notably regarding Login.gov’s initial failure to adhere to Identity Assurance Level 2 (IAL2). (Old news; after the pilot, Login.gov is now certified for IAL2.)

But as usually happens, IAL2 is yesterday’s news. Because biometric tech always gets harder better faster stronger.

Refresher on IAL1, IAL2…and IAL 3

Let’s review the three identity assurance levels.

For our purposes, the big difference between IAL2 and IAL3 is that IAL2 allows “either remote or physically-present identity proofing,” while IAL3 requires “[p]hysical presence” for identity proofing. However, the proofing agent may “attend the identity proofing session via a CSP-controlled kiosk or device.” In other words, supervised enrollment.

When do you need IAL3? Mitek’s Adam Bacia clarifies:

“IAL3 is reserved for high-risk environments such as sensitive government services.”

How are solutions approved for a particular Identity Assurance Level?

Now I could get on my product marketing soapbox and loudly proclaim that my service is IAL2 compliant, or IAL3 compliant, or IAL4 compliant. (“What? You don’t know about IAL4? Obviously you’re not authorized to know about it.”)

But I doubt you would, um, trust my declaration.

Enter the Kantara Initiative, which manages an Identity Assurance Approval Process. For our purposes, we want to focus on the NIST 800-63 rev.3 class of approval:

“Available to Credential Service Providers offering Full or Component Credential Management Services. Modeled on best practice (drawing from, among other sources, ISO/IEC 27001, ISO/IEC 29115), this Class of Approval ensures the provider organization’s good standing and management / operational practices and assesses criteria which are derived strictly from NIST SP 800-63 rev.3 requirements, ensuring a conformant technical provision of the provider organization’s service.

“Assurance Levels: IAL2, IAL3; AAL2, AAL3; FAL2, FAL3”

  • You see that the Kantara Initiative doesn’t even offer an approval for IAL1, just for IAL2 and IAL3.
  • It also offers approvals for AAL2 and AAL3. I’ve previously discussed Authenticator Assurance Levels (AALs) in this post. Briefly, IALs focus on the initial identity proofing, while AALs focus on the authentication of a proven identity.
  • And you can also see that it offers approvals for FAL2 and FAL3. I’ve never discussed Federation Assurance Levels (FALs) before.

Component Services IAL2 approvals…and an IAL3 approval

Now if you go to the Kantara Initiative’s Trust Status List and focus on the Component Services, you’ll see a number of companies and their component services which are approved for NIST 800-63 rev.3 and offer an assurance level of IAL2.

With one exception.

“NextgenID Trusted Services Solution provides Supervised Remote Identity Proofing identity stations to collect, review, validate, proof, and package IAL-3 identity evidence and enrollment data for CSPs operating at IAL-3. The NextGenID TSS Identity Stations enable remote operators to remotely supervise NIST SP 800-63A compliant Supervised Remote Identity Proofing (SRIP) sessions for credentialing.”

So if remote identity assurance is not good enough for you, there’s a solution. I’ve already discussed NextgenID’s SUPERVISED remote identity proofing in this post. And there’s a video.

Trust Swiftly has also designed a remote IAL3 solution, but I couldn’t find Trust Swiftly on the Kantara Initiative’s Trust Status List. Perhaps it was processed under another accredited assessor.

But clearly biometric product marketers are paying attention to the identity assurance levels…at least the real ones (not IAL4). But are they communicating benefit-oriented messages to their prospects?

Biometric product marketing has to be targeted to the right people, with the right message. And the biometric product marketing expert at Bredemarket can help a company’s marketing organization create effective content. Talk to Bredemarket.

Amanda, Light of My Life, They Should Have Made You a Job Scammer’s Wife

This is what happens when an employment fraudster tries to recruit an anti-fraud identity professional. 

Not that she/he/they necessarily knows what I do. The message just refers to my “background information” and “the position” and “the company.”

Seems legit.

“Amanda.” https://www.linkedin.com/in/amanda-rodriguez-155a17378

Here’s the message.

“I am currently working as a Temporary Recruiting Assistant, assisting the company in finding a suitable candidate to fill an open position.

“After reading your background information, I believe that you have the experience and abilities that are highly qualified for this position.

“If you are interested in this opportunity, you are more than welcome to get back to me and I will be happy to provide you with more information about the position.

“Thank you for your time and look forward to your reply!

“Amanda Rodriguez

Temporary Recruitment Assistant | Administrative Support in Talent Acquisition”

I don’t know Spencer Stuart but they presumably wouldn’t hire a clown like this, even in a temporary capacity.

Here’s my reply, but the account disappeared before I could send it.

“If you are truly targeting anti-fraud identity verification product marketing professionals, your pitch itself sounds like it was written by a scammer fraudster. Even in his current condition, Kevin Mitnick wouldn’t fall for this scam.”

Know your recruiter!

Geolocation, Privacy…and Abuse

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I’ve frequently talked about geolocation as a factor of authentication, and have also mentioned the privacy concerns that rise with the use of geolocation for identification.

But sometimes it’s not just an issue of privacy, but something more sinister.

Authentic Living Therapy is a counselor specializing in trauma, abuse, emotional abuse, anxiety, depression, self-harm, parenting, and relationship difficulties. The page recently shared an image post on Facebook with the title

“Tracking someone’s location isn’t always about care. Sometimes, it’s about control.”

I encourage you to read the entire post here.

As with many other privacy-related issues, it all resolves around consent.

  • If Agnes wants Bob to track her location to ensure she is safe, it is fine if Agnes freely consents for Bob to track it.
  • If Bob wants to track Agnes’ location, you need to ensure that Agnes is not being forced to consent.
  • If Bob wants to track Agnes’ location but refuses to let Agnes track Bob’s location, there are many red flags.
By Denelson83 – Own work, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=498580.

If you are a tech marketer and want to share how your identity solution protects individual privacy, I can help you write the necessary content. Let’s meet. Before your competition shares ITS story and steals your prospects and revenue.

Tech marketers, are you afraid?

How Many Authentication Factor Types Are There?

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An authentication factor is a discrete method of authenticating yourself. Each factor is a distinct category.

For example, authenticating with fingerprint biometrics and authenticating with facial image biometrics are both the same factor type, because they both involve “something you are.”

But how many factors are there?

Three factors of authentication

There are some people who argue that there are only really three authentication factors:

  • Something you know, such as a password, or a personal identification number (PIN), or your mother’s maiden name.
  • Something you have, such as a driver’s license, passport, or hardware or software token.
  • Something you are, such as the aforementioned fingerprint and facial image, plus others such as iris, voice, vein, DNA, and behavioral biometrics such as gait.

Five factors of authentication, not three

I argue that there are more than three.

  • Something you do, such as super-secret swiping patterns to unlock a device.
  • Somewhere you are, or geolocation.

For some of us, these are the five standard authentication factors. And they can also function for identity verification.

Six factors of authentication, not five

But I’ve postulated that there is one more.

  • Somewhat you why, or a measure of intent and reasonableness.

For example, take a person with a particular password, ID card, biometric, action, and geolocation (the five factors). Sometimes this person may deserve access, sometimes they may not.

  • The person may deserve access if they are an employee and arrive at the location during working hours.
  • That same person may deserve access if they were fired and are returning a company computer. (But wouldn’t their ID card and biometric access have already been revoked if they were fired? Sometimes…sometimes not.)
  • That same person may NOT deserve access if they were fired and they’re heading straight for their former boss’ personal HR file.

Or maybe just five factors of authentication

Now not everyone agrees that this sixth factor of authentication is truly a factor. If “not everyone” means no one, and I’m the only person blabbering about it.

So while I still work on evangelizing the sixth factor, use the partially accepted notion that there are five factors.

When Social Platforms Convert Users Into Identity Verification Salespeople

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(Author’s preface: I was originally going to schedule this post for the middle of next week. But by the time I wrote it, the end of the post referenced a current event of astronomical proportions. Since said current event may be forgotten by the middle of next week, I am publishing it now.)

As a proponent of identity verification and a biometric product marketing expert I should like this…but I don’t.

I got the message and the message is clear

You get a message on a platform from someone you don’t know. The message may look something like this:

“John ,

“I hope this message finds you well. I came across your profile and was truly impressed by your background. While I’m not a recruiter, I’m assisting in connecting talented professionals with a startup that is working on a unique initiative.

“Given your experience, I believe you could be a fantastic fit for their senior consultant role. If you’re open to exploring this opportunity, I’d be happy to share more details and introduce you to the team directly. Please let me know if you’re interested!”

Let’s count the red flags in this message, which is one I actually received on May 30 from someone named David Joseph:

  • The author was truly impressed by my background, but didn’t cite any specifics about my background that impressed them. This exact same message could be sent to a biometric product marketing expert, a nuclear physicist, or a store cashier.
  • The author is not a recruiter, but a connector who will presumably pass me on to someone else. Why doesn’t the “someone else” contact me directly?
  • The whole unidentified startup working on a unique initiative story. Yes, some companies operate as stealth firms before revealing their corporate identity. Amway. Prinerica. Countless MLMs with bad reputations. Trust me, these initiatives are not unique.
  • That senior consultant title. Not junior consultant. Senior consultant. To make that envelope stuffing role even more prestigious.

I got the note and the note is even clearer

But I wasn’t really concerned with the message. I get these messages all the time.

So what concerned me?

The note attached to the message by the platform that hosted the message.

“Don’t know David? Ask David to verify their profile information before responding for added security.”

The platform, if you haven’t already guessed, is LinkedIn, the message a LinkedIn InMail.

Let’s follow the trail.

  • LinkedIn let “David” use the platform without verifying his identity or verifying that Randstad is truly his employer as his profile states.
  • LinkedIn sold “David” a bunch of InMail credits so that he could privately share this unique opportunity.
  • Now LinkedIn wants me to do its dirty work and say, “Hey David, why don’t you verify your profile?”

Now the one thing in LinkedIn’s favor is that LinkedIn—unlike Meta—lets its users verify their profiles for free. Meta charges you for this.

But again, why should I do LinkedIn’s dirty work?

Why doesn’t LinkedIn prevent users from sending InMails unless their profiles are verified?

The answer: LinkedIn makes a ton of money selling InMails to people without verified profiles. And thus makes money off questionable businesspeople and outright scammers.

Instead of locking down the platform and preventing scammers from joining the platform in the first place.

It’s like LinkedIn openly embraces scammers.

And everyone knows it.

Imagen 4.