IDV Vendor Fraud Networks: Are They Fraud Silos?

Fraud silos take place when companies band together to share fraud data, but the networks are vendor-specific walled gardens.

Fraud networks

I talked about this in my October 8 post “From Synthetic Identities to Zombie Identities.“

Zombie identities go from place to place, never stopping. Google Gemini.
Zombie identities go from place to place, never stopping. Google Gemini.

One way to catch all these zombies is for companies to band together. If the zombie appears at one company, then the other companies are warned if the zombie appears at their doorsteps.

And there are moves to create these fraud networks.

“Veriff sponsors a pooled fraud network, as does Socure, LexisNexis Risk Solutions, Mitek Systems, Persona, Sift, and probably some other IDV companies.”

Another fraud network

Well, add my buddies at Incode to the list.

“TrustGraph [is] Incode’s privacy-preserving trust network built for the agentic era. TrustGraph connects fraud and trust signals across participating institutions without pooling, exchanging, or exposing customer data, so financial institutions, marketplaces, and AI companies can detect repeat fraud and agentic fraud and recognize legitimate customers who have been verified elsewhere. In Incode’s early access program, institutions using TrustGraph detected up to 53% more fraud than with their existing models alone.”

Fraud silos are the IDV version of walled gardens. Google Gemini.
Fraud silos are the IDV version of walled gardens. Google Gemini.

But they’re all fraud silos

All right and fine and wonderful and amazing and stuff, but there’s one teeny tiny problem. If Veriff finds a zombie identity, it only helps if you’re on Veriff’s network. If you are on Incode’s network, you won’t learn anything. And vice versa. Fraud silos don’t help anybody.

Join my fraud silo! Google Gemini.
Join my fraud silo! Google Gemini.

Needless to say, this is by design. In essence, identity verification customers have to choose which walled garden they want as their prison.

You can find a walled garden in identity verification also. From Google Gemini.
You can find a walled garden in identity verification also. From Google Gemini.

So which fraud network are you going to choose? The one with the most participating businesses? Or the one that is best at detecting fraud? What about one with the rebel persona? The one that reads driver’s licenses in 195 countries rather than a mere 190? When you engage in competitive analysis, engage in meaningful competitive analysis.

What if the vendors cooperated and created one mega-fraud network?

Or maybe, just maybe, some of these vendors will band together and create a mega-fraud network with businesses from multiple vendors. Imagine a massive network in which all 80+ identity verification companies share their fraud data with customers in all the vendor ecosystems.

Or maybe not. The likelihood of that happening is similar to the likelihood of Facebook allowing my Bredemarket page to post links to LinkedIn…

Walled gardens are like virtual flypaper. Google Gemini.
Walled gardens are like virtual flypaper. Google Gemini.

Prospects, who consider “proprietary” a bad word, often face these choices of which proprietary ecosystem to join. Why should they join yours?

Maybe Bredemarket can help you state your benefits: https://bredemarket.com/watch-book/

Revised 10/28/2026.

From Synthetic Identities to Zombie Identities

We’ve talked about synthetic identities to death, but what about zombie identities?

“Zombie identities” is the term Veriff uses to describe a particular type of synthetic identity.

“Some identities never really disappear. They keep coming back to apply again and again. The same stolen document, the same face, the same device; rejected on one platform, then recycled on the next. And the next. We call them zombie identities. And traditional onboarding checks weren’t built to recognize a fraudster coming back for another attempt.”

Unless you’re using continuous authentication, persistence never really comes up. And identity verification doesn’t catch it, since you normally apply once and are either accepted or rejected. But what if the fraudulent identity is applying all over the place? What about your website? Your partner’s website? Or your competitor’s website?

There are two possibilities for these zombie identities.

  • Identity verification works. If it works on one site, it can work on others.
  • Identity verification doesn’t work. Now you’d think that the fraudster would discard the rejected identity, but they don’t; “a rejection isn’t the end, either. It’s feedback: fraudsters adjust the lighting, swap the document, change the device, and try again.”
Zombie identities go from place to place, never stopping. Google Gemini.
Zombie identities go from place to place, never stopping. Google Gemini.

It’s a lot easier to adjust an existing identity than to create an entirely new one. So that’s how the zombies come out to play.

So how do you stop the zombie? You can’t destroy its brain or its cells like you would with physical zombies. Veriff suggests the blocklist.

“Closing this gap means looking beyond the current session. That means biometric blocklists that flag a face tied to confirmed fraud. CrossLinks that connect the same document, device, IP or network appearing under different names. And intelligence that spans organizations.”

That last part requires cooperation between companies, even competitors. Veriff sponsors a pooled fraud network, as does Socure, LexisNexis Risk Solutions, Mitek Systems, Persona, Sift, and probably some other IDV companies. If one company reports fraud, this is shared with the pool so other companies in the pool are protected.

And if you’re not in the pool…too bad.

Underwriting the Ghost: Synthetic Borrowers Disappear Without Paying

When a lender receives a loan application, it endeavors to ensure that the applicant will pay the lender back.

But even with the proper controls, a certain percentage of loans go unpaid.

Especially if the applicant looks really good on paper, but isn’t…and doesn’t even exist because it’s a synthetic identity.

PYMNTS describes the threat from deepfake borrowers:

“Across the lending industry, a new category of fraud is emerging that combines deepfake video, cloned voices, synthetic identity creation, fabricated employment histories and AI-generated financial behavior into a single engineered persona. These synthetic borrowers are not merely fake identities in the traditional sense. They are algorithmically optimized consumers designed to survive onboarding checks, satisfy underwriting models and disappear once loans are funded.”

Disappearing borrowers is not a good thing.

Know your customer.

“Underwriting the Ghost.” Synthetic man gets the loan, then he disappears. Google Gemini/Lyria. Public Domain.

The Bangladesh Identities Weren’t Synthetic Identities, But They Failed The “Somewhat You Why” Test

Andrew Austin at Sardine has written an eye-catching blog post that discusses a fraud ring exhibiting unusual patterns.

  • Some fraudsters use synthetic identities to fool systems, but good systems can catch the synths.
  • But other fraudsters use mules and other techniques that pass identity verification checks, because the people are REAL people.
Google Gemini.

Austin’s post discusses an example of the latter.

Sign-up patterns in Bangladesh

In this particular case (Example 3 of 3), a gig economy company had discovered a fraud ring operating out of Bangladesh, but the identities were those of real people. The investigator noticed something right off the bat:

“When we looked into it, something was off: all of the locations seemed to be clustered in a few small towns.”

But wait…it gets better.

“The fraudsters were going door-to-door and signing up anyone who was willing to share their information….

“Dozens of routes snaked through neighborhoods where new accounts were being created, each of them running from North to South and then back to their starting point on the next street over.”

It turns out that the fraudsters were going down each street, paying people to borrow their identities, and then moving on to the next street.

Google Gemini.

How identity factors (in the plural) identified the fraud

In Bredemarket’s view, this raised alarms surrounding two factors of identity verification and authentication.

  • The first was geolocation. Once the identities were plotted, it seems strange that all of the identities lined up down each street and on to the next street.
  • The second is what I call “somewhat you why.“ It’s reasonable to believe that if person A signs up for a service, their neighbors may sign up also. But it’s NOT reasonable to believe that people would sign up for the service in address order, moving from street to street. “No, Jim, 158 1st street can’t sign up for the service! 156 1st street hasn’t signed up yet!”

Now even if you don’t believe that “somewhat you why” is a real factor (Sardine prefers to talk about “device and behavior intelligence“), it’s clear that fraudsters were using the identities of real people to engage in a massive fraud scheme.

Look at the patterns, and you can discover from unusual ones.

And now a word from our sponsor

And if you’re wondering why I discuss SIX factors of identity verification and authentication (rather than five or three), check out my ebook “Proving Humanity: The Six Factors of Identity Verification and Authentication.”

Four pages from "Proving Humanity: The Six Factors of Identity Verification and Authentication" by John E. Bredehoft, Bredemarket. Click on the image to purchase.

Clifford Stoll Was Wrong AND Right

A former coworker reshared the story of Clifford Stoll investigating an accounting error and discovering a Cold War spy network. But a few years later, Stoll was wrong about the emerging Internet…and also right.

Stoll shared his views in a 1995 Newsweek article that was an amusing read after the fact.

Replacing your daily newspaper?

For example:

“The truth is no online database will replace your daily newspaper…”

Stoll lived long enough to see the decline of printed newspapers in the early 21st century.

Electronic books?

Another one:

“How about electronic publishing? Try reading a book on disc. At best, it’s an unpleasant chore: the myopic glow of a clunky computer replaces the friendly pages of a book. And you can’t tote that laptop to the beach. Yet Nicholas Negroponte, director of the MIT Media Lab, predicts that we’ll soon buy books and newspapers straight over the Internet. Uh, sure.”

Let’s pick this one apart piece by piece.

  • A book on disc? What’s a disc?
  • Yes, to some the myopic glow of an electronic book isn’t the best experience, whether on light or dark mode. But a traditional printed book cannot be read at all when you turn the lights off.
  • Stoll assumed that you would always need a laptop to read an electronic book. He did not envision dedicated electronic reading devices that were smaller than a laptop…to say nothing of “smart” phones with an “app” called “Kindle.”
  • Speaking of Amazon Kindles, you CAN buy books straight over the Internet. And music also, from a company that is no longer called Apple Computer.

So Stoll was not perfect. But he anticipated some things that we still struggle with today.

Unedited data!

“What the Internet hucksters won’t tell you is tht the Internet is one big ocean of unedited data, without any pretense of completeness. Lacking editors, reviewers or critics, the Internet has become a wasteland of unfiltered data. You don’t know what to ignore and what’s worth reading.”

While many companies from Yahoo to Altavista to Google to Wikipedia to OpenAI have tried to solve this problem, it is not fully solved.

And then there’s the biggie.

Isolation!

“What’s missing from this electronic wonderland? Human contact. Discount the fawning techno-burble about virtual communities. Computers and networks isolate us from one another. A network chat line is a limp substitute for meeting friends over coffee. No interactive multimedia display comes close to the excitement of a live concert. And who’d prefer cybersex to the real thing?”

Today’s world is actually worse than the one Stoll envisioned. Not only have I conducted most of my interactions with people over chat boxes and screens. But in 2026 we are now interacting with “HAL 9000” non-person entities…and we may not even know that they aren’t human, but synthetic or deepfake identities.

Despite the benefits of remote interactions—they’ve kept me (and my former coworker) employed—Stoll’s warnings about this new world remain valid.

Wrong but right

So I wouldn’t laugh at Stoll’s derision over the emerging Internet. If you were alive in 1995, be honest: did you anticipate THIS?

Animated No-Good Educational Fraudsters 

These are the no-good characters from my Bredemarket blog post earlier today, “Why is Educational Identity Important?” That post quoted from 1Kosmos and Fischer Identity:

“Higher education institutions are increasingly targeted by identity fraud schemes, including “ghost students,” synthetic identities, and financial aid fraud.”

Don’t let these fraudsters rip your university off.

Grok.

Why is Educational Identity Important?

1Kosmos and Fischer Identity (discussed previously) announced a partnership on February 4 to bring “high-assurance identity verification and passwordless authentication to colleges and universities.”

The press release also noted why educational identity is important.

“Higher education institutions are increasingly targeted by identity fraud schemes, including “ghost students,” synthetic identities, and financial aid fraud. At the same time, universities must support digital access for students, alumni, faculty, and staff across fragmented IAM environments that span legacy systems, modern cloud platforms, and third-party services.”

Let’s look at the what.

  • Verify student, alumni, and staff identities using high-assurance proofing and biometric verification
  • Reduce financial aid and enrollment fraud caused by synthetic or stolen identities
  • Strengthen assurance across fragmented IAM environments spanning legacy and modern systems
  • Enable strong, passwordless authentication based on verified digital identity that is reusable and persists across enrollment, academic access, and alumni engagement

If your company provides educational identity solutions, and your message isn’t getting out to your prospects, perhaps you need to talk to the biometric product marketing expert, Bredemarket.

Bredemarket can write your biometric company’s product marketing content.

Proof of IAL3

I was up bright and early to attend a Liminal Demo Day, and the second presenter was Proof. Lauren Furey and Kurt Ernst presented, with Lauren assuming the role of the agent verifying Kurt’s identity.

The mechanism to verify the identity was a video session. In this case, Agent Lauren used three methods:

  • Examining Kurt’s ID, which he presented on screen.
  • Examining Kurt’s face (selfie).
  • Examining a credit card presented by Kurt.

One important note: Agent Lauren had complete control over whether to verify Kurt’s identity or not. She was not a mere “human in the loop.” Even if Kurt passed all the checks, Lauren could fail the identity check if she suspected something was wrong (such as a potential fraudster prompting Kurt what to do).

If you’ve been following my recent posts on identity assurance level, you know what happened next. Yes, I asked THE question:

“Another question for Proof: does you solution meet the requirements for supervised remote identity proofing (IAL3)?”

Lauren responded in the affirmative.

It’s important to note that Proof’s face authentication solution incorporates liveness detection, so there is reasonable assurance that the person’s fake is not a spoof or a synthetic identity.

So I guess I’m right, and that we’re seeing more and more IAL3 implementations, even if they don’t have the super-duper Kantara Initiative certification that NextgenID has.

Why is Morph Detection Important?

We’re all familiar with the morphing of faces from subject 1 to subject 2, in which there is an intermediate subject 1.5 that combines the features of both of them. But did you know that this simple trick can form the basis for fraudulent activity?

Back in the 20th century, morphing was primarily used for entertainment purposes. Nothing that would make you cry, even though there were shades of gray in the black or white representations of the morphed people.

Godley and Creme, “Cry.”
Michael Jackson, “Black or White.” (The full version with the grabbing.) The morphing begins about 5 1/2 minutes into the video.

But Godley, Creme, and Jackson weren’t trying to commit fraud. As I’ve previously noted, a morphed picture can be used for fraudulent activity. Let me illustrate this with a visual example. Take a look at the guy below.

From NISTIR 8584.

Does this guy look familiar to you? Some of you may think he kinda sorta looks like one person, while others may think he kinda sorta looks like a different person.

The truth is, the person above does not exist. This is actually a face morph of two different people.

From NISTIR 8584.

Now imagine a scenario in which a security camera is patrolling the entrance to the Bush ranch in Crawford, Texas. But instead of having Bush’s facial image in the database, someone has tampered with the database and inserted the “Obushama” image instead…and that image is similar enough to Barack Obama to allow Obama to fraudulently enter Bush’s ranch.

Or alternative, the “Obushama” image is used to create a new synthetic identity, unconnected to either of the two.

But what if you could detect that a particular facial image is not a true image of a person, but some type of morph attempt? NIST has a report on this:

“To address this issue, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has released guidelines that can help organizations deploy and use modern detection methods designed to catch morph attacks before they succeed.”

The report, “NIST Interagency Report NISTIR 8584, Face Analysis Technology Evaluation (FATE) MORPH Part 4B: Considerations for Implementing Morph Detection in Operations,” is available in PDF form at https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8584.

And a personal aside to anyone who worked for Safran in the early 2010s: we’re talking about MORPH detection, not MORPHO detection. I kept on mistyping the name as I wrote this.