EBTS the Movie, “Inside the FBI’s EBTS”: Using Google’s NotebookLM to Create Videos From Non-Copyrighted Material

Do you want to skip the book and watch the movie version? Thanks to Google’s NotebookLM, you can.

I used the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Electronic Biometric Transmission Specification (EBTS) for this exercise.

What should you NOT upload to NotebookLM?

But there’s two things I need to say about the EBTS:

  • First, the EBTS is a public document and not a top secret document. You can download the EBTS yourself from the https://fbibiospecs.fbi.gov/ebts-1/approved-ebts-1 URL. For my test I used version 11.3 of the EBTS from earlier this year.
  • Second, the EBTS is a public domain document and is not copyrighted. This is something I need to emphasize. If you’re going to take a magazine article and make a movie out of it, the copyright holder may have something to say about that.

Both points are important. If you want to upload your employer’s confidential report into NotebookLM for analysis…well, you probably shouldn’t. But the public, non-copyrighted EBTS is safe for this exercise.

Uploading the EBTS to NotebookLM

So I uploaded the EBTS into NotebookLM, and as expected, I received a short text sumnmary of the document.

“This document outlines the technical specifications for the electronic exchange of biometric and biographic information between various law enforcement agencies and the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Next Generation Identification (NGI) System. It details the Transaction Offense Types (TOTs), which are the standardized requests and responses used for services such as identification, verification, investigation, and data management. Furthermore, the text specifies the precise data fields, formats, and codes required for the submission and retrieval of diverse biometric data, including fingerprints, palm prints, facial images, and iris scans, while also setting forth image quality specifications for scanner and printer certification.”

Now I could continue to query NotebookLM about the document, but I chose to request a video overview instead. This feature was introduced a few months ago, but I missed it.

“Video Overviews transform the sources in your notebook into a video of AI-narrated slides, pulling images, diagrams, quotes, and numbers from your documents. They distill complex information into clear, digestible content, providing a comprehensive and engaging visual deep dive of your material.” 

So I launched the video overview creation feature, and waited. As I waited, I mused upon the time it would take me to create this video manually, and I also mused on the usual LLM warning that the result may contain inaccuracies.

I didn’t have to wait that long, maybe 15 minutes, and Google delivered this 7-minute video.

Inside the FBI’s EBTS. Created by Google NotebookLM based upon EBTS Version 11.3.

Not too bad…especially considering that the video was created based upon a single source. Imagine if I had provided multiple sources, such as an old version of the Electronic Fingerprint Transmission Specification (EFTS); then the video may have covered the evolution of the standard.

Oh, and I also created a 12-minute audio version, which NotebookLM structures as a two-host podcast. This is similar to the podcast I generated in late 2024 about…me.

Unpacking the EBTS standard. Created by Google NotebookLM based upon EBTS Version 11.3.

In an environment where many people like to watch or listen rather than read, this helps provide a quick overview. But you still have to dive into the document and read it to truly understand it.

Worries About the Certified Communist Products List

(Imagen 4)

(Part of the biometric product marketing expert series)

How many of you have heard of the Certified Products List (CPL)?

The CPL’s vendor coverage

This list, part of the FBI’s Biometric Specifications website (FBI Biospecs), contains fingerprint card printers, fingerprint card scan systems, identification flats systems, live scan systems, mobile ID devices, and other products. Presence on the CPL indicates that the product complies with a relevant image quality specification such as Appendix F of the Electronic Biometric Transmission Specification.

The Certified Products List has existed since the 1990s and includes a number of products with which I am familiar. These products come from companies past and present, including 3M Cogent, Aware, Biometrics4All, Cross Match, DataWorks Plus, IDEMIA Identity & Security France, Identicator, Mentalix, Morpho, Motorola, NEC Technologies, Printrak, Sagem Defense Securite, Thales, and many others.

As of June 26, 2025, it also references companies such as Shenzhen Interface Cognition Technology Co., Ltd. and Shenzhen Zhi Ang Science and Technology Co., Ltd.

A strongly worded letter

Those and other listings caused heartburn for the bipartisan Members of the U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party.

So they sent a strongly worded letter.

“We write to respectfully urge the FBI to put an end to its ongoing certification of products from Chinese military-linked and surveillance companies—including companies blacklisted or red-flagged by the U.S. government—that could be used to spy on Americans, strengthen the repressive surveillance state of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and otherwise threaten U.S. national security.”

Interestingly enough, they make a big deal of Hikvision products on the list, but I searched the CPL multiple times and found no Hikvision products.

The CPL’s purpose

And it’s important to note the FBI’s own caveat about the CPL:

The Certified Product List (CPL) provides users with a list of products that have been tested and are in compliance with Next Generation Identification image quality specifications (IQS) regarding the capture of friction ridge images. Specifications and standards other than image quality may still need to be met. Appearance on the CPL is not, and should not be construed as, an FBI endorsement, nor should it be relied upon for any requirement beyond IQS. Users should contact their State CJIS Systems Officer (CSO) or Information Security Officer (ISO) to ensure compliance with the necessary policies and/or guidelines.

In other words, the ONLY purpose of the CPL is to indicate whether the products in question meet technology standards. It has nothing to do with export controls or any other criteria that any law enforcement agency needs to follow when buying a product.

What about the U.S. Department of Commerce?

But the FBI isn’t the only agency “promoting” Chinese biometrics.

Wait until the Select Committee discovers the Department of Commerce’s NIST FRTE lists, including the FRTE 1:1 and FRTE 1:N lists. The tops of these lists (previously known as FRVT) include many Chinese companies.

And actually, the FRTE testing includes facial recognition products that inspired U.S. export bans. Fingerprint devices are harder to use to repress people.

What next?

What happens if the concern extends beyond China, to products produced in France and products produced in Canada?

Regarding the strongly worded letter, Biometric Update added one detail:

“As of this writing, the FBI has not issued a public response. Whether the bureau will move to decertify the flagged companies or push back on the committee’s recommendations remains to be seen. But with multiple national security statutes already in place, and Congress signaling a willingness to legislate further, the days of quiet certification for foreign adversary-linked tech firms may be numbered.”

Well, the Writer Was 60% Correct (Face-Iris Pixels Per Inch)

(Part of the biometric product marketing expert series)

I recently read a web page (I won’t name the site) that included the following text:

…fingerprints, palm prints, latents, faces, and irises at 500 or 1000 ppi.

Which is partially correct.

Yes, fingerprints, palm prints, and latent prints are measured in pixels per inch (ppi), with older systems capturing 500 ppi images, some newer images capturing 1,000 ppi images, and other systems capturing 2,000 ppi or larger images. 2,000 ppi resolution is used in some images in NIST Special Database 300 because why not?

I don’t know of any latent fingerprint examiner who is capturing 4,000 ppi friction ridge prints, but I bet that someone out there is doing it.

But faces and irises are not measured in pixels per inch.

Why not?

Because, at least until recently, friction ridge impressions were captured differently than faces and irises.

  • Since the 19th century, we’ve naturally assumed that friction ridges are captured via a contact method, whether by inking the fingers and palms and pressing against a paper card, pressing the fingers and palms against a livescan platen, or pressing a finger on a designated spot on a smartphone.
  • You don’t press your face or iris against a camera. Yes, you often have to place your iris very close to a camera, but it’s still a contactless method.
This is not a recommended method of facial image acquisition. From https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4XhWFHKWCSE.

Obviously things have changed in the friction ridge world over the last decade, as more companies support contactless methods of fingerprint capture, either through dedicated devices or standard smartphone cameras.

And that has caused issues for organizations such as the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, who have very deep concerns about how contactless fingerprints will function in their current contact-based systems.

For example, how will Electronic Biometric Transmission Specification Appendix F (version 11.2 here) compliance work in the world where the friction ridges are NOT pressed against a surface?

When Rapid DNA Isn’t

(Part of the biometric product marketing expert series)

Have you heard of rapid DNA?

Perhaps not as fast as Brazilian race car driver Antonella Bassani, but fast enough.

This post discusses the pros and cons of rapid DNA, specifically in the MV Conception post mortem investigation.

DNA…and fingerprints

I’ve worked with rapid DNA since I was in Proposals at MorphoTrak, when our corporate parent Safran had an agreement with IntegenX (now part of Thermo Fisher Scientific). Rapid DNA, when suitable for use, can process a DNA sample in 90 minutes or less, providing a quick way to process DNA in both criminal and non-criminal cases.

By Zephyris – Own work, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=15027555

But as I explain below, sometimes rapid DNA isn’t so rapid. In those cases, investigators have to turn to boring biometric technologies such as fingerprints instead. Fingerprints are a much older identification modality, but they still work.

DNA, fingerprints…and dental records

Bredemarket recently purchased access to a Journal of Forensic Sciences article entitled “Advances in postmortem fingerprinting: Applications in disaster victim identification” (https://doi.org/10.1111/1556-4029.15513) by Bryan T. Johnson MSFS of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Laboratory in Quantico. The abstract (which is NOT behind the paywall) states the following, in part:

In disaster victim identification (DVI), fingerprints, DNA, and dental examinations are the three primary methods of identification….As DNA technology continues to evolve, RAPID DNA may now identify a profile within 90 min if the remains are not degraded or comingled. When there are true unknowns, however, there is usually no DNA, dental, or medical records to retrieve for a comparison without a tentative identity.

In the body of the paper itself (which IS behind the paywall), Johnson cites one example in which use of rapid DNA would have DELAYED the process.

DVI depends upon comparison of a DNA sample from a victim with a previous DNA sample taken from the victim. If this is not available, then the victim’s DNA is compared against the DNA of a family member.

Identifying foreign nationals aboard the MV Conception

MV Conception shortly before it sank. By National Transportation Safety Board – Screen Shot 2020-10-16 at 3.00.40 PM, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=95326656

When the MV Conception boat caught fire and sank in September 2019, 34 people lost their lives and had to be positively identified.

While most of the MV Conception victims were California residents, some victims were from Singapore and India. It would take weeks to collect and transport the DNA samples from the victims’ family members back to the United States for comparison against the DNA samples from the victims. Weeks of uncertainty during which family members had no confirmation that their relatives were among the deceased.

However, because the foreign victims were visitors to the United States, they had fingerprints on file with the Department of Homeland Security. Interagency agreements allowed the investigating agencies to access the DHS fingerprints and compare them against the fingerprints of the foreign victims, providing tentative identifications within three days. (Fingerprint identification is a 100+ year old method, but it works!) These tentative identifications were subsequently confirmed when the familial DNA samples arrived.

What does this mean?

The message here is NOT that “fingerprints rule, DNA drools.” In some cases the investigators could not retrieve fingerprints from the bodies and HAD to use rapid DNA.

The message here is that when identifying people, you should use ANY biometric (or non-biometric) modality that is available: fingerprints, DNA, dental records, driver’s licenses, Radio Shack Battery Club card, or anything else that provides an investigative lead or a positive identification.

And ideally, you should use more than one factor of authentication.

And now a word from our sponsor

By the way, if you have a biometric story to tell, Bredemarket can help…um…drive results. Perhaps not as fast as Bassani, but fast enough.

A Few Thoughts on FedRAMP

The 438 U.S. federal agencies (as of today) probably have over 439 different security requirements. When you add state and local agencies to the list, security compliance becomes a mind-numbing exercise.

  • For example, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation has its Criminal Justice Information Systems Security Policy (version 5.9 is here). This not only applies to the FBI, but to any government agency or private organization that interfaces to the relevant FBI systems.
  • Similarly, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has its Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Security Rule. Again, this also applies to private organizations.

But I don’t care about those. (Actually I do, but for the next few minutes I don’t.) Instead, let’s talk FedRAMP.

Why do we have FedRAMP?

The two standards that I mentioned above apply to particular government agencies. Sometimes, however, the federal government attempts to create a standard that applies to ALL federal agencies (and other relevant bodies). You can say that Login.gov is an example of this, although a certain company (I won’t name the company, but it likes to ID me) repeatedly emphasizes that Login.gov is not IAL2 compliant.

But forget about that. Let’s concentrate on FedRAMP.

Why do we have FedRAMP?

The Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP®) was established in 2011 to provide a cost-effective, risk-based approach for the adoption and use of cloud services by the federal government. FedRAMP empowers agencies to use modern cloud technologies, with an emphasis on security and protection of federal information. In December 2022, the FedRAMP Authorization Act was signed as part of the FY23 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The Act codifies the FedRAMP program as the authoritative standardized approach to security assessment and authorization for cloud computing products and services that process unclassified federal information.

From https://www.fedramp.gov/program-basics/.

Note the critical word “unclassified.” So FedRAMP doesn’t cover EVERYTHING. But it does cover enough to allow federal agencies to move away from huge on-premise server rooms and enjoy the same SaaS advantages that private entities enjoy.

Today, government agencies can now consult a FedRAMP Marketplace that lists FedRAMP offerings the agencies can use for their cloud implementations.

A FedRAMP authorized product example

When I helped MorphoTrak propose its first cloud-based automated biometric identification solutions, our first customers were state and local agencies. To propose those first solutions, MorphoTrak partnered with Microsoft and used its Azure Government cloud. While those first implementations were not federal and did not require FedRAMP authorization, MorphoTrak’s successor IDEMIA clearly has an interest in providing federal non-classified cloud solutions.

When IDEMIA proposes federal solutions that require cloud storage, it can choose to use Microsoft Azure Government, which is now FedRAMP authorized.

It turns out that a number of other FedRAMP-authorized products are partially dependent upon Microsoft Azure Government’s FedRAMP authorization, so continued maintenance of this authorization is essential to Microsoft, a number of other vendors, and all the agencies that require secure cloud solutions.

They can only hope that the GSA Inspector General doesn’t find fault with THEM.

Is FedRAMP compliance worth it?

But assuming that doesn’t happen, is it worthwhile for vendors to pursue FedRAMP compliance?

If you are a company with a cloud service, there are likely quite a few questions you are asking yourself about your pursuits in the Federal market. When will the upward trajectory of cloud adoption begin? What agency will be the next to migrate to the cloud? What technologies will be migrated? As you move forward with your business development strategy you will also question whether FedRAMP compliance is something you should pursue?

The answer to the last question is simple: Yes. If you want the Federal Government to purchase your cloud service offering you will, sooner or later, have to successfully navigate the FedRAMP process.

From https://www.mindpointgroup.com/blog/fedramp-compliance-is-it-worth-it.

And a lot of companies are doing just that. But with less than 400 FedRAMP authorized services, there’s obviously room for growth.

If We Don’t Train Facial Recognition Users, There Will Be No Facial Recognition

(Part of the biometric product marketing expert series)

We get all sorts of great tools, but do we know how to use them? And what are the consequences if we don’t know how to use them? Could we lose the use of those tools entirely due to bad publicity from misuse?

Hida Viloria. By Intersex77 – Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=98625035

Do your federal facial recognition users know what they are doing?

I recently saw a WIRED article that primarily talked about submitting Parabon Nanolabs-generated images to a facial recognition program. But buried in the article was this alarming quote:

According to a report released in September by the US Government Accountability Office, only 5 percent of the 196 FBI agents who have access to facial recognition technology from outside vendors have completed any training on how to properly use the tools.

From https://www.wired.com/story/parabon-nanolabs-dna-face-models-police-facial-recognition/

Now I had some questions after reading that sentence: namely, what does “have access” mean? To answer those questions, I had to find the study itself, GAO-23-105607, Facial Recognition Services: Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Should Take Actions to Implement Training, and Policies for Civil Liberties.

It turns out that the study is NOT limited to FBI use of facial recognition services, but also addresses six other federal agencies: the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (the guvmint doesn’t believe in the Oxford comma); U.S. Customs and Border Protection; the Drug Enforcement Administration; Homeland Security Investigations; the U.S. Marshals Service; and the U.S. Secret Service.

In addition, the study confines itself to four facial recognition services: Clearview AI, IntelCenter, Marinus Analytics, and Thorn. It does not address other uses of facial recognition by the agencies, such as the FBI’s use of IDEMIA in its Next Generation Identification system (IDEMIA facial recognition technology is also used by the Department of Defense).

Two of the GAO’s findings:

  • Initially, none of the seven agencies required users to complete facial recognition training. As of April 2023, two of the agencies (Homeland Security Investigations and the U.S. Marshals Service) required training, two (the FBI and Customs and Border Protection) did not, and the other three had quit using these four facial recognition services.
  • The FBI stated that facial recognition training was recommended as a “best practice,” but not mandatory. And when something isn’t mandatory, you can guess what happened:

GAO found that few of these staff completed the training, and across the FBI, only 10 staff completed facial recognition training of 196 staff that accessed the service. FBI said they intend to implement a training requirement for all staff, but have not yet done so. 

From https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-23-105607.

So if you use my three levels of importance (TLOI) model, facial recognition training is important, but not critically important. Therefore, it wasn’t done.

The detailed version of the report includes additional information on the FBI’s training requirements…I mean recommendations:

Although not a requirement, FBI officials said they recommend (as
a best practice) that some staff complete FBI’s Face Comparison and
Identification Training when using Clearview AI. The recommended
training course, which is 24 hours in length, provides staff with information on how to interpret the output of facial recognition services, how to analyze different facial features (such as ears, eyes, and mouths), and how changes to facial features (such as aging) could affect results.

From https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-105607.pdf.

However, this type of training was not recommended for all FBI users of Clearview AI, and was not recommended for any FBI users of Marinus Analytics or Thorn.

I should note that the report was issued in September 2023, based upon data gathered earlier in the year, and that for all I know the FBI now mandates such training.

Or maybe it doesn’t.

What about your state and local facial recognition users?

Of course, training for federal facial recognition users is only a small part of the story, since most of the law enforcement activity takes place at the state and local level. State and local users need training so that they can understand:

  • The anatomy of the face, and how it affects comparisons between two facial images.
  • How cameras work, and how this affects comparisons between two facial images.
  • How poor quality images can adversely affect facial recognition.
  • How facial recognition should ONLY be used as an investigative lead.

If state and local users received this training, none of the false arrests over the last few years would have taken place.

What are the consequences of no training?

Could I repeat that again?

If facial recognition users had been trained, none of the false arrests over the last few years would have taken place.

  • The users would have realized that the poor images were not of sufficient quality to determine a match.
  • The users would have realized that even if they had been of sufficient quality, facial recognition must only be used as an investigative lead, and once other data had been checked, the cases would have fallen apart.

But the false arrests gave the privacy advocates the ammunition they needed.

Not to insist upon proper training in the use of facial recognition.

But to ban the use of facial recognition entirely.

Like nuclear or biological weapons, facial recognition’s threat to human society and civil liberties far outweighs any potential benefits. Silicon Valley lobbyists are disingenuously calling for regulation of facial recognition so they can continue to profit by rapidly spreading this surveillance dragnet. They’re trying to avoid the real debate: whether technology this dangerous should even exist. Industry-friendly and government-friendly oversight will not fix the dangers inherent in law enforcement’s discriminatory use of facial recognition: we need an all-out ban.

From https://www.banfacialrecognition.com/

(And just wait until the anti-facial recognition forces discover that this is not only a plot of evil Silicon Valley, but also a plot of evil non-American foreign interests located in places like Paris and Tokyo.)

Because the anti-facial recognition forces want us to remove the use of technology and go back to the good old days…of eyewitness misidentification.

Eyewitness misidentification contributes to an overwhelming majority of wrongful convictions that have been overturned by post-conviction DNA testing.

Eyewitnesses are often expected to identify perpetrators of crimes based on memory, which is incredibly malleable. Under intense pressure, through suggestive police practices, or over time, an eyewitness is more likely to find it difficult to correctly recall details about what they saw. 

From https://innocenceproject.org/eyewitness-misidentification/.

And these people don’t stay in jail for a night or two. Some of them remain in prison for years until the eyewitness misidentification is reversed.

Archie Williams moments after his exoneration on March 21, 2019. Photo by Innocence Project New Orleans. From https://innocenceproject.org/fingerprint-database-match-establishes-archie-williams-innocence/

Eyewitnesses, unlike facial recognition algorithms, cannot be tested for accuracy or bias.

And if we don’t train facial recognition users in the technology, then we’re going to lose it.