I’ve previously noted that one possible sign of a scammer is when they don’t initiate a LinkedIn connection to you, but instead want you to initiate a LinkedIn connection to them. When a scammer is scamming, they can’t blow through a few thousand connection requests every day, so it’s better if the victims initiate the connection request themselves.
I immediately thought of this when I received an email from a Gmail account to one of my odd accounts entitled “Thinking of connecting.”
Um…why not just do it?
Here’s the text with the scammer’s alleged name changed:
“I saw your profile on LinkedIn and wanted to say hello. I’m Melania.
“I’ve always been interested in learning about different professional paths. This is just a friendly intro for the start of the week—no expectations on my end.”
Obviously I didn’t respond. Because I have no idea who the Gmail account holder REALLY is.
A day later, I received a second message that included the following:
“Things are actually pretty smooth and manageable on my end as the Operations Manager at Estée Lauder, so I’ve had some extra time to catch up with my network. I’d love to hear how your side of the world is treating you whenever you have a moment.”
Again, I didn’t respond. I didn’t even ask for “Melania’s” Estee Lauder email address (again, the emails are from a Gmail account).
Then we got to day three. Remember how Melania said she had viewed my LinkedIn profile? This was the next question she asked:
“Is it snowing where you are?”
Obviously she hadn’t read anything, and I was getting bored, so I blocked her from all email addresses.
Of all the KYx acronyms (Know Your Customer, Know Your Business, etc.), two that interest LinkedIn users are Know Your Employer and Know Your Employee. How do you fight fraudulent employers and employees? And how do your prospects learn about your fraud fighting?
“A recent development is scammers using the name of legitimate companies that are hiring and approaching their victims through LinkedIn’s direct messaging feature. They then create counterfeit websites that look like the websites of the legitimate companies they are posing as and ask the job seekers for personal information…”
And you can guess what happens with that personal information. It doesn’t land you a real job, that’s for sure.
In addition to the tips that Scamicide provides, I have an additional one. BEFORE you provide your resume, before you send them a connection request, or definitely before you engage on Telegram or WhatsApp, ask this question:
“Can you provide me with your corporate email address?”
This usually shuts scammers up very quickly.
But don’t forget that while job applicants are avoiding fraudulent employers, legitimate employers are avoiding fraudulent applicants…perhaps from North Korea.
I was messaged on LinkedIn by Jenniffer Martinez, purportedly from HS Hyosung USA. She wanted my email address to send information about a job opportunity.
Why?
“After reviewing your resume and relevant experience, we believe your management experience, professional background, and career stability are a strong match for Yaskawa Group’s current talent needs.”
(Only now did I notice the reference to Yaskawa Group, whatever it is.)
Eventually I told “Jenniffer” that I had contacted her employer directly.
By 11:30 she had deleted her entire conversation, which is why I took screen shots immediately.
And I never even got around to asking her for HER corporate email address.
No word from HS Hyosung USA, but it knows all about Jenniffer now (see final screen shot).
2025 has been a year of declutterring and focusing.
The declutterring is the hardest. I may still love that long sleeve shirt with holes in the right elbow. (Why always the right elbow? I’m left handed.) But it’s no longer good for me, and I should have gotten rid of it years ago.
Whether it’s a former friend—a great person who went silent and indifferent—or a newsletter from a company that rejected my 2023 job application and only contacted me afterwards because GDPR required it—the time has come to simplify and focus.
Now just a few hundred LinkedIn newsletters and email subscriptions to go.
Is it only smartphone game app users who are inundated with an unrelenting barrage of Kalshi ads?
If nothing else, the barrage inspired me to research Designated Contract Markets (DCMs). A DCM is a status granted and regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), a federal agency. As such, Kalshi argues that it is exempt from state gaming regulations because it’s not hosting gambling. It’s hosting futures trading.
Gemini.
But Kalshi and similar apps such as Polymarket are opposed by DraftKings, FanDuel, and other sports betting apps. They make no pretense of “trading futures,” but comply with state-level gambling regulations, and use geolocation to prohibit mobile sports betting in states such as California where it is illegal.
And both are opposed by Native American casinos governed by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) of 1988, which allows sovereign tribal nations to host traditional Indian games.
And they are opposed by other card houses, racetracks, bingo games, and state sponsored lotteries.
And all are opposed by the traditional Las Vegas casinos…except when they themselves host mobile apps and strike licensing deals with Native American casinos.
But the mobile app variants not only deal with geolocation, but also digital identity verification and age verification.
And employment verification or non-verification to ensure that football players aren’t betting on football games.
Gemini.
Plus authentication to open the app and ensure Little Jimmy doesn’t open it.
Gemini.
There are all sorts of gaming identity stories…and Bredemarket can help identity/biometric marketers tell them.
“In Jordan, the apparel sector relies heavily on a large migrant workforce, many of whom lack access to bank accounts and remain unbanked. Wage payments have traditionally been cash-based…”
To facilitate cash payments to unbanked apparel workers in Jordan, IrisGuard stepped in with its EyePay product.
“Cairo Amman Bank (CAB) Jordan…has launched a national-scale biometric cash salary payment network for unbanked workers.
“With just a simple iris scan, employees can securely access their wages instantly, without the need for a bank account, PIN, or physical ID.”
I don’t think this is tied to an iris-based time and attendance system, but that is the obvious next step.
In reality, job applicant deepfake detection is (so far) unable to determine who the fraudster really is, but it can determine who the fraudster is NOT.
Something to remember when hiring people for sensitive positions. You don’t want to unknowingly hire a North Korean spy.